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Standard of Review 
When reviewing the dismissal of a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court accords 
no deference to the conclusion of law that underlie the dismissal. They are reviewed for correctness. 
Neelv.Holden 886 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1994). 
In addition, the party attacking the Constitutionality of a Statute has the burden of 
affirmatively demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional. Kennecott Corp v. Utah State Tax 
Commin 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) 
Summary of Arguments 
The sentencing proceedings and decisions adopted by the member of the Utah board of 
Pardons and Parole are unconstitutional because Utah's present Indeterminate Sentencing process 
violates a number of individual rights. 
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ARGUMENTS 
A - The case is not moot 
Judge Lewis, before disqualification, raised the issue, Sue Sponte, of mootness because 
Petitioner is currently on parole. However in the case of Jones v. Cunningham 371 U.S. 236 
(1963), the U.S. Supreme Court said "What matters is that [parole] significantly restrain petitioner's 
liberty ... such restraints are enough to invoke the help of the great writ... and it was therefore error 
for the Court of Appeals to dismiss his case as moot" Id at 243. 
B - The Trial Court enroled in dismissing the petition as frivolous. 
The Trial Court errored in dismissing the case as frivolous. Rule 65B requires a petitioner to 
allege that the respondents have violated at least some portion of the rule. Lancaster v. Utah Board 
of Pardons 869 P.2d 945, 947-48 (Utah 1994) Petitioner has done so. 
D -Utah Code §77-18-4 is Unconstftutiooal 
"it is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department... to determine whether 
a legislative enactment is consistent with the Constitution ..." Marbury v. Madison 1 cranch 
137,177 (1803). Just because the indeterminate sentence has been the prevailing philosophy in 
Utah, does not mean that it is constitutional. 
Under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, every person convicted of a crime "... shall 
continue [under sentence] until the maximum period [of the term provided by law for a particular 
crime] has been reached..." Utah Code Ann §7748-4. 
In other words every criminal offender in the same like legal category automatically 
receives the maximum sentence provided under the law for his or her respective offense. 
See eg. State v. Nemier 148 P.2d 327, 331 (1944) (indeterminate sentence was a definite sentence 
for the maximum term there in stated). 
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Such a mechanical approach to sentencing as that prescribed by §77-18-4 is 
unconstitutional. First, such an approach does not comport with the principles of indeterminate 
sentencing " A true indeterminate sentence is one with a sufficient difference between the minimum 
and maximum limit..." People v. Buxton 328 N.E. 2d 703, 708 (App. Ill 1975) (and cases cited). 
Next, §77-18-4 does not comport with the principles of due process and equal protection of 
the law found within the U.S. Constitution. "The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 
guarantees reasonable speedy sentencing determinations" See eg. Maghsoudi v. INS 181 F3d 8, 
12 (1st cir 1999). The U.S. Supreme Court says the due process clause has f... a role to play in 
protecting against oppressive delays." U.S. v. Lauasco 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977). 
The indeterminate sentence is much more than an oppressive delay, it leaves offenders in a 
continual state of anxiety and unknowingness for long periods of time as to what their actual 
sentence will be. More importantly, this two stage sentencing process allows the Board of Pardons 
and Parole to consider things outside the sentence - which has prejudiced the petitioner; Courts 
assess prejudice in the light of interests of the defendant. 
The equal protections clause, on the other hand, in respect to sentencing systems, mandates 
proportionality. That is to say: "A fundamental principle of federal equal protection is that they 
should treat persons who are dissimilarly situated dissimilarly" emphasis added. 
See United States v. Burnison 379 U.S. 87 (1950); Mclavghlin v. State of Florida 379 U.S. 184 
(1964); Enmund v. Florida 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Williams v. New York 337 U.S.241 (1949) 
"the belief no longer prevails that every 
offense in the like legal category calls for 
an identical punishment" Id at 247. 
Several courts have held that the failure to individualize a sentence compels reversal or 
resentencing U.S. v. Monaco 852 F.2d 1143 (9th cir 1988); United States v. Barker 771 F.2d 
1362 (9th cir 1985); United States v. Lopez-Gonzales 688 F.2d 1275 (9th cir 1982). 
In Barker the Court engaged in mechanical sentencing when it imposed same maximum 
sentence on all five defendants, even though there was evidence of different levels of involvement. 
See Barker 771 F.2d at 1366-67. In Lopez-Gonzales the Court remanded for resentencing 
because "Judge stated that he automatically imposes the maximum sentence whenever an illegal 
alien is apprehended" (See Lopez-Gonzales 688 F.2d at 1277. 
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Whether you like it or not, Utah Code Ann §77-18-4 is a mechanical approach to 
sentencing. This Court cannot pawn off the Constitutional requirements, provisions, and guarantees 
of the Equal Protection clause to the Board of Pardons and Parole, which has been erroneously 
done in the past. See Malan v. Lewis Utah 693 P.2d 661, 669 (1984); Barker v. Matheson Utah 
607 P.2d 233, 234 (1979). 
Malan and Barker Id. will not withstand constitutional muster because there is no 
constitutional nor inherent right to parole Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional Complex 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). There is no guidelines nor boundaries to prevent the 
Board of Pardons and Parole form abusing its authority. Failure of the Courts to require the Board to 
adhere to the Sentencing Guidelines renders §77-18-4 unconstitutional. 
It is quite clear that Due Process and Equal Protection issues arise in connection with the 
manner that reductions are applied against a defendant's sentence. The rehabilitative expertise 
theory for permitting a Parole Board to exercise unreviewable discretion is, without doubt, subject 
to constitutional restraint. In the case of Carmona v. Ward 576 F.2d 405 (2nd cir 1978). the 
majority and Justice Oaks dissenting, held that "the constitutionality of the sentence depended upon 
the discharge from parole." Id at 419. 
A similar challenge was made to an Oklahoma indeterminate statute. 
See Baker v. Cowlev 931 F.2d 1394 (10th cir 1994). (citing Carmona v. Ward Id.) 
Unlike Utah, the statute in Baker provided for a true indeterminate sentence between ten years to 
life. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of the statute for two reasons. 
First, "The Court was not convinced that Baker had received a life sentence."; Secondly, "The 
federal Courts will not hesitate to intervene in parole decisions if their constitutional rights are 
violated." Idatl394n.5. 
The challenge at hand is distinguishable from the Baker case. Utah Code §77-18-4 provides 
for the maximum term; thus Utah's five and ten to life statutes are undoubtedly a life sentence. 
see eg. Padilla v. Utah Bd of Pardons P.2d (Utah 1995) (citing §77-18-4 'every 
person ... shall continue under sentence until the maximum period has been reached.). 
Both the Baker and Carmona Courts said they would not hesitate to review the parole 
board's decisions. Utah Courts, on the other hand, have consistently refused to "engage in a 
substantive review of the Board's decisions." 
(see eg. Neel v. Holden 886 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1994) 
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Statutes fixing different sentences for different crimes have been given the traditional broad 
deferences generally accorded, see eg. Tigner v. Texas 310 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1980). However, 
under §77-18-4 defendants who are dissimilarly situated automatically receive the same sentence; 
the statute is entitled to either a heightened or intermediate level of scrutiny. 
Where the power of the State weighs most heavily upon 
the individual or the group, the Courts must be especially 
sensitive to the policies of the equal protection clause. 
Moreover, when a proper challenge to the constitutionality 
of a given statute is made, the said statute must be examined 
to determine if it is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied, 
see eg. In Re criminal Investigation 7th District Court no CSI 
754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988). 
The State of Utah has a legitimate interest in treating dissimilarly situated defendants 
dissimilarly; That-is-to-say, a penological goal of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and 
rehabilitation. There is abundant evidence that the legislature contemplated and attempted to assure 
some measure of equal protection in sentencing. (See Utah Code Ann §63-25a-304 promulgating 
sentencing and release guidelines.) 
Indeterminate Sentencing leads to disparities 
In Crime in America, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, offers some illustration of 
disparity in sentencing. Often in different courtrooms in the same court house. 
Two boys fail to report for military induction. One is sentenced to five years in prison, the 
other gets probation. One Judge sentences a robber convicted for the third time, to one year 
in prison, while another Judge on the same bench gives a first time offender, ten years. One 
man far more capable of serious crime than another and convicted of the same offense, may 
get a fine, while the less fortunate and less dangerous person is sentenced to five years in 
prison. One Judge, because of his personal values, thinks homosexuality most heinous of 
crime and gives long sentences; another hates prostitution; a third judge would never jail 
juveniles for either offense. Some judges regularly give juvenile offenders prison terms for 
first offense car theft, while others turn them over to the custody of their parents. 
Because of such disparities, there was a period when indeterminate sentencing was viewed 
by reformers as the only viable alternative to sentencing disparities. The notion was that a five 
member panel would make rational decisions. However, many criminologists now agree that 
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indeterminate sentences actually result in longer prison terms than most judges would mete out and 
that the disparity in sentencing is actually increased rather than reduced. Utah's indeterminate 
sentence structure is not an exception to this concept. 
In 1984 congress observed that the indeterminate sentencing system had two unjustified 
and shameful consequences, the first was the great variation among sentences imposed by different 
judges upon similarly situated offenders. The second was the uncertainty as to the actual time the 
offender would spend in prison. 
Each it said "was a serious impediment to an evenhanded and effective operation of the 
criminal justice system." The report went on to note that parole was an "inadequate device for 
overcoming these undesirable consequences" See eg. Mistretta v. United States 488/U.S. 361(1989) 
See also U. S. Dept. of Justice S. Shane - Dubow A. Brown & E. Olaen. Sentencing reform 
in the United States: History content & effect 6 - 7 (Aug 1985) (studies of indeterminate sentencing 
schemes found that similarly situated defendants often received widely disparate sentences) 
A. Campbell Law of Sentencing 13 (1978) (Although indeterminate sentencing was intended to 
soften the harsh and uniform sentences formerly imposed under mandatory sentencing system, 
studies revealed that indeterminate sentencing actually had the opposite effect.) 
Let me say it again, Utah's indeterminate sentence is not an exception to this rule (emphasis 
added) equal protection stands as a bar to prevent similarly situated offenders from being treated 
dissimilarly. 
Indeterminate Sentencing violates the Sixth Amendment and has prejudiced the Petitioner. 
The High Court has not had the chance to determine if and how the sixth amendment, 
Speedy Trial Clause, applies to the indeterminate sentence. However, it is very clear that the Sixth 
Amendment applies at sentencing. Pollard v. United States 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (assuming 
arguendo) see eg. Apprendi v. New Jersey 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Sixth Amendment Speedy 
Trial guarantee is binding on the states through the Due Process clause. 
Klopfer v. North Carolina 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967) and "the declaration of rights is 
comprehensive in its application to all activities of state government." Foote v. Utah Bd of Pardons 
808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). 
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Justice O'Conner realized that the Sixth Amendment would apply with greater strength to a 
discretionary sentencing scheme than to determinate sentencing. Apprendi 530 U.S. at 548. 
She said "The potential for mischief ... is much greater" Id. The Sixth Amendment clearly 
stands a3 a bar to protect the criminal defendant against potentially arbitrary board members. The 
potential for mischief is simply too great. 
Moreover the Speedy Trial clause of the Sixth Amendment protects against sentencing 
delays, see: Burkett v. Cunningham 826 F.2d 1208, 1225-26 (3rd cir 1987); Simmons v. Reynolds 
898 F.2d 865, 868 (2nd cir 1990); Coev.Thurman 922 F.2d 528, 531-32 (9th cir 1990) (4 year 
delay, during which appellant continuously asserted rights, violated due process under Barker test.). 
In determining whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial courts 
consider that four Barker factors. Barker v. Wingo 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Courts generally hold 
that a delay approaching one year is presumptively prejudicial see Doggett v. United States 505 
U.S. 647, 652 n.l (1992); Rheuark v. Shaw 628 F.2d 297, 302-03 (5th cir 1980) (adopting 4 part 
Barker test). Petitioner is eleven years into a one to fifteen sentence and still does not know the 
actual length of his sentence. Since 2002 Petitioner has repeatedly requested in writing, for the 
Board of Pardons and Parole to determine the length of his sentence in accordance with the Sixth 
Amendment and Due Process clause, see McNeelv vJ31anas 336 F.3d 822, 831 (9th cir 2003) 
(repeated assertions of speedy trial right); see also U.S. v. Thomas 167 F.3d 299, 304 (6th cir 1999) 
(29 months delay in resentencing triggered Barker factors). When considering the "reason for the 
delays", the Court must realize that the Board is responsible for the delays. According to Utah Code 
the Board schedules parole grant hearings. 
Finally eleven years is presumptively prejudicial and oppressive. This two stage sentencing 
scheme that the State of Utah employs, is prejudicial by nature, because it allows the Board to 
consider things outside the actual crime; Like prison write-ups, an alienist report, the public's 
perceived fear, etc. 
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CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-4 is a mechanical approach to sentencing and unconstitutional 
because it treats dissimilarly situated defendants similarly. Indeterminate sentencing in general, is 
unconstitutional because it treats similarly situated defendants dissimilarly and the Sixth 
Amendment stands as a bar to protect against potentially arbitrary board members and oppressive 
sentencing delays. 
This Honorable Court should remand this case back to the Trial Court so as to give 
Petitioner a new hearing before the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
Respectfully submitted this f*P day of -3"iM^ , 2006. 
Robert D. Straley 
pro se. 
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